Information-Theoretically Secure Protocols and Security Under Composition
Speaker: Tal Rabin , IBM
Date: March 17 2006
Time: 10:30AM to 12:00PM
Location: 32-G449, Patil/Kiva
Contact: Be Blackburn, 3-6098, imbe@mit.edu
Relevant URL:
We investigate the question of whether security of protocols in the
information-theoretic setting (where the adversary is computationally
unbounded) implies the security of these protocols under concurrent
composition. This question is motivated by the folklore that all
known protocols that are secure in the information-theoretic setting
are indeed secure under concurrent composition. We provide answers to
this question for a number of different settings (i.e., considering
perfect versus statistical security, and concurrent composition with
adaptive versus fixed inputs).
Our results enhance the understanding of what is necessary for
obtaining security under composition, as well as providing tools
(i.e., composition theorems) that can be used for proving the security
of protocols under composition while considering only the standard
stand-alone definitions of security.
Joint work with: Eyal Kushilevitz and Yehuda Lindell
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