The Second-Knowledge Mechanism
Speaker: Silvio Micali , CSAIL, MITContact:
Date: February 1 2011
Time: 4:15PM to 5:15PM
Host: Scott Aaronson, CSAIL, MIT
Be Blackburn , 3-6098, email@example.comRelevant URL:
In auctions of a single good, we consider a new revenue benchmark that always lies between the highest and second-highest valuation, prove that no classical mechanism can achieve it (or even slightly approximate it) in any robust way, and provide a new mechanism that perfectly and robustly achieve it.
Our work puts forward a new set-theoretic way of modeling and leveraging the knowledge that the players may have about their opponents.
Joint work with Jing Chen.
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