Perfectly Resilient Mechanisms
Speaker: Jing Chen , CSAIL, MIT
Date: October 22 2010
Time: 10:30AM to 12:00PM
Location: 32-G449 Patil/Kiva
Host: Shafi Goldwasser, CSAIL, MIT
Contact: Be Blackburn , 3-6098, imbe@mit.edu
Relevant URL: We call a mechanism perfectly resilient if it is totally immune to the
problems of collusion, complexity, and privacy. In a setting of
complete information and quasi-linear utilities, we construct such a
mechanism for generating virtually maximum revenue. Our mechanism has
a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, requires the players to
communicate the minimum number of bits, keeps the players' preferences
private to the maximum possible extent, and works no matter who
colludes with whom ---as long as not all players belong to the same
collusive set--- and no matter how well collusive players may
coordinate their actions.
Joint work with Avinatan Hassidim and Silvio Micali.
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