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How Secure are Secure Internet Routing Protocols?
A decade of research has been devoted to addressing vulnerabilities in the Internet’s interdomain routing system. The result is a plethora of security proposals, each providing different types of security guarantees. To inform decisions about which of these protocols should be deployed in the Internet, we use both theory and simulations to *quantify* the ability of these protocols to blunt a particularly dangerous form of attack, namely, when an attacker manipulates routing protocol messages in order to attract traffic to its network (so that it can eavesdrop, tamper, or drop traffic). The key implication of our work is that network access control mechanisms (e.g. route filtering) can be as effective as cryptographic routing protocols. Moreover, we present a series of counterintuitive examples, found in the empirical data, to show that the attack strategies considered by most prior work can *underestimate* the severity of these attacks.