Speaker: Avinatan Hassidim , RLE, MIT
Date: March 2 2010
Time: 4:15PM to 5:15PM
Contact: Be, 3-6098, email@example.com
> A mechanism can be viewed as a function which maps the actions of the
> players (e.g. bids in an auction) to an outcome (e.g. who gets what
> goods) and to a vector of prices (how much each player pays). A basic
> question in mechanism design is that of implementability: "Suppose
> someone specifies the outcome for each set of inputs. Is there a
> pricing rule which will cause the players to be truthful?"
> In the talk I will present an exact characterization of which
> functions are implementible and which are not. Time permitting, I will
> discuss two functions which can not be implemented, and show how a
> weaker notion of implementation is relevant for them.
> The talk is based on joint works with Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman,
> Jing Chen, Silvio Micali, Dov Monderer and Al Roth.
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