Rational Secret Sharing
Speaker: Jonathan Katz , University of Maryland
Date: April 24 2009
Time: 10:30AM to 12:00PM
Location: 14th Floor Tea Lounge, Microsoft Research NE
Contact: Be, 3-6098, imbe@mit.edu
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Designers of cryptographic protocols traditionally view all parties as either arbitrarily malicious (i.e., acting unpredictably) or completely honest (i.e., slavishly following the protocol). A more realistic perspective might be that everyone is simply *rational*: i.e., willing to deviate from the protocol, but only so long as they accrue some benefit from doing so. How should protocols be designed in such a setting?
We examine this question in the specific case of secret sharing. We begin by reviewing work from 2006 showing a protocol for rational secret sharing under the (somewhat unrealistic) assumption of simultaneous broadcast. We then discuss more recent results giving rational secret sharing protocols for asynchronous, point-to-point networks that achieve a stronger notion of equilibrium (namely, (computational) strict Nash equilibrium).
Bio:
Jonathan Katz is an associate professor of computer science at the University of Maryland, and a co-author of the textbook "Introduction to Modern Cryptography". He received his bachelors degrees in chemistry and mathematics from MIT in 1996, and a PhD in computer science from Columbia University in 2002. He enjoys rock climbing in his free time.
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