Game Theory with Costly Computation
Speaker: Rafael Pass , Cornell UniversityContact:
Date: May 6 2008
Time: 4:15PM to 5:30PM
Location: 32-G449 (Kiva)
Host: Silvio Micali, MIT
Alexandr Andoni, 617 253 6182, firstname.lastname@example.orgRelevant URL: http://theory.csail.mit.edu/theory-seminars/calendar.html
[Please note the UNUSUAL LOCATION, 32-G449.]
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. Using this framework, we provide a game-theoretic definition of protocol security that takes both computation and incentives into account.
We show that a special case of the definition is equivalent to a variant of precise zero-knowledge (Micali and Pass, STOC'06). This result shows that the two approaches used for dealing with "deviating" players in two different communities---Nash equilibrium in game theory, and zero-knowledge "simulation" in cryptography---are intimately connected; indeed, they are essentially equivalent in the context of secure computation.
Prior knowledge of game theory or cryptography is not assumed.
Joint work with Joseph Halpern.
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