CSAIL Event Calendar: Previous Series
Adaptive and Truthful Online Mechanisms in Single-Valued Preference Domains
Speaker: David C. Parkes , Harvard University
Relevant URL: http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/theory-seminars/calendar.html
Computational mechanism design addresses the general problem of decision making in multi-agent systems when agents are self-interested and have private information that is relevant to making the right decision. This talk considers dynamic environments, and asks: how can one implement good, system-wide decision policies in worlds in which agents arrive and depart and have preferences on sequences of decisions? This challenge is relevant to many computational and societal settings; e.g., sponsored search, grid computing, logistics and the supply chain. Moving from the general to the specific, we discuss variants of the pivotal mechanism for this setting before focusing on single-valued preference domains. Here, we identify the importance of restricted misreports and anytime-monotonicity, and provide a theoretical and computational framework within which to design and analyze adaptive, truthful, online mechanisms.