CSAIL Event Calendar
Algorithmic Multidimensional Mechanism DesignSpeaker: Costis Daskalakis, CSAIL, MIT Date: Tuesday, September 11 2012 Time: 4:15PM to 5:15PM Refreshments: 3:45PM Location: 32-124 Host: Dana Moshkovitz, CSAIL, MIT Contact: Be Blackburn, 3-6098, imbe@mit.edu Relevant URL: http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2012/comp-sci-econ-0625.htmlIn his seminal paper, Myerson [1981] provides a revenue-optimal auction for a seller who is looking to sell a single item to multiple bidders. Extending this auction to simultaneously selling multiple heterogeneous items has been one of the central problems in Mathematical Economics. We provide such an extension that is also computationally efficient.
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